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The other day I came across my "pocket mission
report" for the 351st Squadron, dated September 29, 1944 to April
27, 1945.
Within two hours after each mission, Squadron
Engineering would report to Group Operations the status of each
plane. Operations had a large board showing the individual status of
the entire group. This information was vital for the mission they
were then planning for the next day.
Usually by midnight, Squadron Engineering would
be advised as to the next effort and which planes would be involved.
We would then load these planes with the specified amount of fuel,
and ordnance would hang the correct number and type of bombs. Also
placed on board was the ammunition, oxygen, communications and other
special details. The crew chief would then pre-flight the plane. As
dawn broke, our final gesture would be topping off the fuel tanks to
replace the gas used for the pre-flight. As the Madam said, "We are
open 24 hours a day, but mostly at night."
In reviewing this diary, I was drawn to a special
section on "Engine Changes." This operation was a function of each
plane’s ground crew and was performed in all types of weather at the
plane’s hardstand. Upon completion, our squadron inspector would
give it their OK, and the plane would then be subjected to a
four-hour test flight. I had a squadron rule that the crew chief
would fly as the flight engineer on these flights.
All told, this status report covered 211 days,
during which our squadron had 124 engine replacements.
In addition to the date of engine failure and the
plane number, this report listed the flight hours on the engine and
the reason for the failure. This provided some interesting
statistics of the combat stress on the plane.
The average flying time on the failed engines was
213.5 hours. Low Compression was the greatest cause for
failure with 29% of the total. Excessive oil consumption and
internal failure were close with 23% each. Only 8 failures
were attributed to battle damage. Eight engines were removed
at the discretion of the Engineering Officer and another 8
for an excessive number of hours. In these circumstances, it
was more than 400 ours. Of the balance, 6 were removed due to
runaway prop and 3 for sudden stoppage.
These figures indicated that the 351st changed,
on an average, 17.5 engines/month for a fleet of 17 planes.
Extrapolating would indicate the Group would be
replacing 70 engines per month. The Eighth Air Force with 46 groups,
would require 3,200 engines per month to maintain the bombing
effort.
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